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Abstract
The following is a model of psychological contracting with unmonitorable
performance, implicit o¤ers, and screening for non-performance by the an-
nouncement of the expectation of performance. It is motivated by the $250
billion prescription drug industry, which spends $19 billion per year on market-
ing to US doctors, mostly on gifts, and often, as at Yale, with no monitoring
for reciprocation. In one revealing incident, a drug rm representative closed
her presentation to Yale medical residents by handing out $150 medical ref-
erence books and remarking, "one hand washes the other." By the next day,
half the books were returned. I model this with a one shot psychological trust
game with negative belief preferences and asymmetric information. I show that
the shameof accepting a possible bribe can screen for reciprocation induc-
ing guilt. An announcement can extend the e¤ect. Current policies to deter
reciprocation might aid such screening. I also discuss applications like vote
buying when voting is unobservable and why taxis drivers in Naples announce
inated fares after their service is sunk.
JEL Codes: C72, D82, D86, H51, H75, I11, I18, M31, M37, M41
Keywords: bribery, guilt, shame, gifts, drug rms, doctors, social norms,
indirect speech, psychological trust game, contracting
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1 Introduction
Medical professionals, health policy makers, and the public have become increasingly
concerned at the coincidence of:
1) rising expenditure on prescription drugs: $64 billion in 1995, $151 billion in
2001 and $252 billion in 2006 [Herper and Kang, 2006] (with an estimated one-
quarter of this increase resulting from a shift to the prescribing of more expensive
drugs [Dana and Loewenstein, 2003])
2) extraordinary protability of drug rms not commensurate with innovation:
76% were deemed only moderately more e¢ cacious by the US Food and Drug
Administration [Dana and Loewenstein, 2003], and
3) large expenditures on marketing to doctors: $18,000-$29,000 [Brennan et. al.,
2006] per doctor per year mostly on gifts.
(See Appendix B: Background on Pharmaceutical Industry Gift Giving for more
details.) A revealing incident occurred several years ago at Yale New Haven Hospital.
After the pharmaceutical rm representative (Drug Rep) closed her presentation to
Yale medical residents (doctors in training) by handing out medical reference books
worth $150, she unexpectedly remarked, that "one hand washes the other" (from
now on referred to as "insinuation"). By the next day, half the books were returned.
According to an informal survey by the Director of the residency program, those
who returned the books claimed that they were shocked by the drug reps quid pro
quo o¤er. The other half claimed that they had known the bribing intent all along,
had discounted the gesture, and hence, would not have been inuenced in their
prescribing1.
This incident raises several questions of economic interest.
1Reported by a former Yale Medical resident Melinda L. Randall.
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A)Why are gifts given when they cannot be conditioned on increased prescribing?
Yale, for example, does not release prescribing data to drug rms2.
B) How can an announcement make a good into a bad?
C) Under what conditions would the Drug Rep want to make such an announce-
ment?
I address these questions in a model of psychological contracting where: 1) per-
formance is unmonitorable, 2) o¤ers are veiled (which captures the usual case where
gifts are given and nothing is said), and 3) the mere announcement of the expectation
of performance (e.g., "one hand washes the other...") can either enforce performance
or screen for non-performance. Applied to Yale incident, I show that the shame of
accepting a possible bribe, rather than being a hindrance to bribing, can in fact be
instrumental to making e¤ective bribes.
In this introduction, I will develop my model by ruling out simpler models. Due
to unmonitorability, any model of this situation would have to be one shot. But,
in a game where the Drug Rep (she) can give a gift, or not, and the Doctor (he)
has a choice of reciprocating at some cost, or not, the Doctor would not reciprocate
and hence, the Drug Rep would not give. Even if we were to make this a standard
psychological game, where the Doctor felt guilt3 (here, the product of guilt sen-
sitivity and the Doctors belief about the Drug Reps belief in reciprocation) from
disappointing the expectation of the Drug Rep for reciprocation, that would not
explain the announcement and its e¤ect returned books. Similarly, "kindness" as
in [Rabin, 1993], could be a motive for reciprocation, but not for rejection. Nor
would the mere introduction of shame (the product of shame sensitivity and 2nd
order expectation for reciprocation), as in [Tadelis, 2008], explain the Yale incident.
Tadelis showed that the threat of merely being observed can deter a bad action. But
here, the subsequent prescribing of the doctors was not observable.
To explain the announcement and rejection, I introduce asymmetric information
into a psychological game where negative belief preferences (shame and guilt) are
2Private communication with the Director of Pharmacy Services at Yale-New Haven Hospital.
3See [Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2008] for a general model of guilt, and [Charness and Dufwen-
berg, 2006] and [Fong et. al., 2007] for experimental evidence that guilt can induce reciprocation.
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di¤erentially a¤ected by it. There are now two types of Drug Reps, a bribing type,
who only gives in the expectation of reciprocation, and a non-bribing type, who likes
to give 4. There are two types of Doctors, a highly shame averse type (H) and a not
so highly shame averse type (L). Reciprocation is shameful but unobservable before
a passive player, the Patient5.
The sequence of play is as follows. Nature moves to choose the types of Drug
Reps and Doctors facing each other. The Drug Rep can then: 1) give a gift, 2) give
and insinuate, and 3) not give, where 2) is more costly for the non-bribing Drug
Rep. Each type of Doctor observes the Drug Reps choice and updates his beliefs on
the type of Drug Rep he faces. The Doctor then chooses to accept or reject given
the shame of acceptance. Observers update their beliefs on which type of Doctor is
accepting. Each type of Doctor chooses to reciprocate or not given his guilt.
Due to asymmetric information about the Drug Reps type, the Doctors guilt
now depends upon his belief that he is facing the bribing Drug Rep and his belief
that the bribing Drug Rep is expecting reciprocation from his type. Due to unobserv-
ability of the shameful act (reciprocation), an otherwise innocuous act, acceptance, is
shameful for everyone when anyone reciprocates. Formally, the shame of acceptance
is now the product of each type of Doctors shame sensitivity and the type weighted
beliefs about beliefs about the rates of reciprocation of all types of Doctors who ac-
cept. In other words, shame is here modelled as a function of ex ante beliefs, while
guilt is modelled as a function of ex post beliefs6. Equilibrium behavior then becomes
driven by the interplay between, shame, the public bad among all types who accept,
and guilt, the private bad of each who disappoints an expectation for reciprocation
from his type7. The announcement, which increases guilt at non-reciprocation, in-
4As reported in the Yale incident and as shown in surveys [Kaiser Foundation Survey, 2001],
a signicant portion did not suspect that drug rms are out to inuence their prescribing with
gifts. Drug rms promotional material try to conrm this impression. See their websites (e.g.,
www.pzer.com). Hospitals, including Yale, have instructional interventions for doctors to explain
how drug rms may be trying to inuence them.
5The doctor can be interpreted as feeling shame at acceptance before a passive player, the
Patient, or other doctors, or even before the Drug Rep herself.
6This is consistent with the psychological and economics literature. See [Tadelis, 2008] and
[Tangney, Dearing, 2002]:
7Thus, in a partial pooling equilibrium, where both types of Doctors are accepting, but only H
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creases reciprocation, which increases the ex-ante expectation of reciprocation, which
increases the shame of acceptance and hence, decreases acceptance. Thus due to the
interplay between shame and guilt, the Drug Rep is thus faced with a trade-o¤ be-
tween reciprocation per acceptance and acceptance in deciding how much to veil her
o¤er.
The model is predictive given the correlation between shame and guilt sensitivities
of the Doctors present. Equilibrium 1 captures the ideal situation for the bribing
Drug Rep; when she just gives a gift and all types of Doctors reciprocate. The most
interesting cases are when some types of Doctors are accepting but not reciprocating,
i.e., free-riding. One such case is where there is strong negative correlation between
shame and guilt sensitivities (Equilibrium 3). Then, a gift alone can screen for non-
reciprocation. In this case, H, the type who is most sensitive to shame, and hence,
most likely to reject, is least sensitive to guilt and hence, least likely to reciprocate. To
cause this H to reject, the Drug Rep can merely buy a cheaper gift before the game
begins (Equilibrium 2). In contrast, when there is not strong negative correlation, a
gift alone cannot screen for non-reciprocation. For example, with positive correlation,
L, the type who is the least sensitive to shame, and hence, least likely to reject, is the
least sensitive to guilt, and hence, least likely to reciprocate (Equilibrium 3H). A gift
rejected by L would also be rejected by H, the type who is most likely to reciprocate.
In some of these cases, the Drug Rep can increase the guilt of L enough by insinuating
to cause him to reciprocate (Equilibrium 4L). However, when observers are sure that
whoever accepts is reciprocating, H could be too shamed to accept. If instead H
had been free-riding, as can be the case when there is weakly negative correlation
(Equilibrium 3L), the Drug Rep can in some of these cases get rid ofH by insinuating
is reciprocating, only the H type can feel guilt in deviating to not reciprocate. However, though
L is not reciprocating (and hence, not expected to) he will nonetheless feel the same shame as H
at acceptance, because the Patient cannot tell them apart. In other words, shame is a function
of the ex-ante belief of reciprocation (because the Patient does not know which type of Doctor is
accepting) and guilt is a function of the ex-post belief (because each type of Doctor knows what
is expected of him in equilibrium). Thus, in a pooling equilibrium, shame is a public bad among
all who accept, but guilt is a private bad for each who does not reciprocate, when he is expected to
reciprocate. It is the interaction between these two bads that drives the behavior of the Doctors,
and ultimately, the behavior of the Drug Rep.
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(Equilibrium 6). Furthermore, even if H had been reciprocating (Equilibrium 3¯H),
if the shame externality of L reciprocating would force a trade-o¤ between either H
accepting or L accepting, the Drug Rep could still choose L (Equilibrium 5L).
Assuming that the Drug Rep insinuated rationally in the Yale incident, my results
show that those who kept the gift and said that they would not have reciprocated
were in fact lying. Those who had rejected the gift were lying only if Equilibrium
4L applied.
In the policy section, I show that:
1. Perversely, gift ceilings, gift registries, educational interventions can help the
Proposer screen for reciprocation because they act like insinuation.
2. Bans on gifts imply o¤-equilibrium beliefs that shame all doctors, even those
who would not have accepted. This helps to explain why bans, the most obvious
solution, has been used only in a handful of hospitals.
3. Surveys of doctors beliefs about what their colleagues would do, had they ac-
cepted an expensive gift, can enlist non-credible shame to deter those who
would have accepted and not reciprocated from accepting8.
"Sorting with Shame in the Laboratory" [Ong, 2008a] simulated aspects of the
incentives of the above Yale incident in a controlled laboratory experiment and con-
rmed the prediction that shame can sort.
1.0.1 Other Applications
Beyond the $252 billion US prescription drug market, the $89 billion student loan
industry also employed gifts to market loan products to nancial aid councilors.
Preliminary research indicates that, like drug rms, loan rms could not monitor
for reciprocation in the form of recommendations of their products to students, and
8The o¤-equilibrium belief results arise from a novel notion of "belief supports," which contain
beliefs about what a type of Doctor would have done, had he accepted. Such an unreached belief
support may contain non-credible beliefs about what that doctorH would have done had he accepted.
More details in section 3.4.5.
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may also have relied upon psychological factors like guilt and shame to target gifts
to get reciprocation. Guilt and shame may have important unobservable inuence
on the subjective judgments of credit rating and accounting agencies when their
consulting arms get lucrative contracts. Reciprocation for bribes in elections are also
unobservable. After voters accept the bribe, they can still vote however they like.
Shame modulated by insinuation may also be used there to screen for reciprocation.
My model may also help explain more mundane behavior like why taxi drivers in
Naples, who have no meters, tell you the price of the ride after you arrive, when their
service is sunk. Announcing a high price after arrival would be rational, if those who
were less likely to ask for the price before the ride, e.g., out of shame from looking
cheap, would also be averse to disappointing the taxi driver after arriving.
A scandal in a duciary eld can change expectations just like insinuation did
in the Yale incident. In [Ong, 2008a], I show how the shame from a scandal may
sort out those who are most trustworthy from a duciary eld, as Enron may have
done in accounting. That raises the question of how expert professions might select
for trustworthy people and hence, conserve the trust they need to function. Using
another variant of this model, I demonstrate in [Ong, 2008b] why the pro bono work
among doctors, which amounted to $12 billion in 2001, may help screen out people
who would cheat on their patients, and hence damage the reputation of all doctors.
I use another variant of this model to capture the phenomena of bundling to avoid
shame in consumer products (e.g., the inclusion of political articles with female nudes
in Playboy during the 1950s or Biblical themes in nudes in the Renaissance). (See
[Ong, 2008c] for details.)
The model is in section 2. I dene the equilibrium concept in section 3.1, develop
aspects of equilibria in section 3.2 and list propositions proved in section 3.3. See
game tree in Appendix A. Proofs are in available upon request.
2 The Model
Let 1 2 fB;:Bg denote the Proposers (his) types, where B stands for bribing and
:B for not bribing. B only gives in the expectation of reciprocation. The expectation
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of reciprocation is not inferrable from :B giving9. (See below for more details on
payo¤s.) 2 2 R+ is the shame aversion of the 2 type 2 2 fH;Lg or Responder
(her) where H > L, where H stands for highly shame averse and L stands for
not highly shame averse. A type also has a guilt aversion 2 2 R+, which I specify
per equilibrium. The presence of a passive observer (the Patient) is reected in the
Responders heightened shame sensitivity.
The sequence of play is:
1. Nature moves rst to choose the B Proposer with probability p1 and L
Responder with probability p2.
2. Each type of Proposer may give a gift :i or give and insinuate i or not
give 10.
3. Each type of Responder may accept a or reject :a
4. If he accepts, he may reciprocate r or not reciprocate :r, unobserved by
the Proposer.
The game tree is in Appendix A. The action is ommitted since nothing interesting
happens if the Proposer does not want to give. To avoid introducing further notation
in an already complicated model, I will use these action letters a and r also stand for
mixed behavioral strategies where appropriate,e.g., when they determine equilibrium
beliefs.
2.1 Responders Payo¤
v =value of the gift. e =cost of reciprocation. v > e  0:
9A casual perusal of drug rm websites will show that drug rm promotion portray drug rms
as altruistic, or the least, not just prot maximizing. As late as 2001, 40% of doctors did not realize
that drug rms monitored their prescribing patterns [Kaiser Foundation Survey, 2001]. According
to [Madhavan et. al., 1997], "physicians slightly agreed that pharmaceutical companies give gifts to
physicians to inuence their prescribing." Thus, it seems plausible that to physicians, there could
be an altruistic drug rm, in which case, no expectation of reciprocation can be inferred.
10The "not give" option is ommitted from the tree to avoid further clutter. This is no loss because
those equilibria without giving are uninteresting.
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For each type of Responder 2 2 fH;Lg :
2 =guilt sensitivity where 2 (B) > 0 and 2 (:B) = 0:
2 =shame sensitivity where 2  0:
I 2 I is information set of the Proposer (and Patient) after Responder accepts,
modelling the Proposers uncertainty as to which type of Responder accepted and
whether that type is reciprocating or not. There are four such information sets,
one for each combination of Proposer and her actions: I = fIBi; IB:i; I:Bi; I:B:ig :
Each of those information sets contain four possible histories, which di¤er only as to
whether a certain type of Responder reciprocated or not11.
1 =updated belief that the Proposer is the B type given that she gives, gives
and insinuates or does not give.
2 =updated belief that the Responder is the L type given observed acceptance.
Since the Responder has preferences over Proposers beliefs, in equilibrium, he
will, in a sense to be dened in the equilibrium concept below, have beliefs in his
utility function.  (I) and 2 (I) should be interpreted as payo¤ parameters when in
utility functions and beliefs otherwise. They are equal in equilibrium.
 (I) =Responders belief about the observers belief about the rate of reciproca-
tion of whoever is accepting at I 2 I. Hence,  (I) = 1 would be the 2nd order belief
that "whoever accepts reciprocates."
2 (I) =Responder 2s belief of observersbelief about 2s rate of reciprocation
after acceptance. Hence, 2 (I) = 1 would be the 2s 2nd order belief that "if I
accept, I would be expected to reciprocate."
In equilibrium, the average rate of reciprocation conditional on acceptance  (I)
is the 2 weighted average of beliefs about the rate of reciprocation 2 (I) of each
type 2 conditional on acceptance. The conditional beliefs are used here because I
11In Ibi; where the bribing Proposer (b) has insinuated (i), for example, the possible histories
would be:
f(BL; i; a; r) ; (BL; i; a;:r) ; (Bc; i; a; r) ; (Bc; i; a;:r)g
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assume that Responders care about the beliefs of Proposers only if they accept.
 (I) = L (I)  2 + H (I)  (1  2) (1)
The support of 2 (I) is represented by dashed belief support setsin the tree
in Appendix A. The standard information sets which enclose the belief support sets
represent the uncertainty of an observer who knows neither which type is accepting,
nor whether they are reciprocating.
Payo¤ of Responder after:
1. non-acceptance: 0:
2. accepting and reciprocateing: v   e  2 (I) :
3. accepting and not reciprocating: v   122 (I)  2 (I) :
2.2 Proposers Payo¤
I assume that insinuation is free for the B Proposer, who cares only about material
payo¤s. Hence, his payo¤s from insinuating or not depends only upon the Respon-
ders consequent acceptance and rate of reciprocation, in which acceptance increases
costs by k and reciprocation increases revenue by R. Let i 2f0; 1g be the rate of
insinuation for the Proposer and ri be the rate of reciprocation for the Responder.
The prots for the B Proposer is then:
B (i; ri) = (ri R + (1  ri)  0  k) = (riR  k) (2)
Since the B Proposer is not sure about which type of Responder she is facing, she
chooses i to maximize her expected payo¤s:
max
i
E (B (i; ri)) = max
i
f2 (rLiR  k) + (1  2) (rHiR  k)g (3)
The game is uninteresting if the Proposer does not give. Clearly, the B Proposer
will only give if she is making non-negative prots. This requires that, if either type
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of Responder accepts, at least one reciprocates; xing a choice of either i = 1 or
qi = 1; if rL = 1 or rH = 1, the Proposer earns positive prots.
R (p2 (rL) + (1  p2) (rH)) > k (4)
3 Equilibrium Analysis
3.1 Psychological Weak Sequential Equilibrium
A psychological Bayesian extensive form game is a collection of Bayesian extensive
form games parametrized by 2 ; 2 2 fH;Lg :
  =
D
N;H; (i) ; (pi) ;
 
u
i
 
2

822f0;1g;822fH;Lg
E
(5)
As in a standard game, N is the set of players, H is the set of histories, i is the
set of types for each player i, pi is the prior probability distribution of player i over
other players types and u
i
is the utility of player i. The key di¤erence here is the
use of the utility parameters 2 ; 2 2 fH;Lg :
In a psychological game, it is as if we could distinguish each a specic value of
2 for each 2 2 fH;Lg : Within each game, each type of Proposer chooses to give
:i or insinuate and give i, or not give, given his belief 2 of facing L and expected
rates of reciprocation after acceptance. In equilibrium, 2 =
p2aL
p2aL+(1 p2):aH ; the
prior weighted ratio of acceptances. Each type of Responder 2 2 fH;Lg decides
on acceptance a2 or non-acceptance :a2 , given his shame aversion 2; the value
of the gift v and his anticipated consequent guilt, should he not reciprocate, or his
cost of reciprocation e, should he reciprocate: After acceptance, each type 2 of
Responder would choose to reciprocate r or not, given his guilt aversion 22 , his
cost of reciprocating e; and his belief about the Proposers expectation of type 2s
reciprocation rate 2 . This denes the WSEs for each G 2  . The PWSEs are what
remains of the WSEs in   after we throw out every WSEs in which the beliefs 2
are not consistent with the payo¤ parameter 2 that they should stand in for, for
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every type 2 at every information set I on the equilibrium path 12. In other words,
the PWSEs are the restriction of G 2   such that:
2 (I) = r2 (I) ;8I 2 I;82 2 fH;Lg (6)
I will call my equilibrium concept psychological weak sequential equilibrium
(PWSE), which is based on the weak sequential equilibrium concept (WSE)13. In
a WSE, every player maximizes his utility at every information set and beliefs are
Bayesian where possible.
3.2 Aspects of Equilibria
The Responder needs to rank four pure strategies (r; a) ; (r;:a) ; (:r; a) and (:r;:a) :
Let these rankings be represented in the following short hand:
(r  :r) := (r; a)  (:r; a)
(:r  :a) := (:r; a)  (r;:a) and (:r; a)  (:r;:a)
(r  :a) := (r; a)  (r;:a) and (:r; a)  (:r;:a)
(7)
the conditions for which I will derive in the following.
The (r qa) Condition: At each information set I 2 I for each type 2 2 fH;Lg ;
12A psychological game can be interpreted as a short hand for a larger signaling game. Take
Beer Quiche. In a separating equilibrium, player 2 (he) is sure of player 1s type after observing her
action. Therefore, player 2s belief about what action would occur in such an equilibrium can only
depend upon his prior on each type. Because player 2s beliefs inuence player 2s reaction to player
1s signal, player 1s payo¤s depends upon player 2s belief about what player 1 will do. Player 1s
payo¤s are then functions of player 2s beliefs about player 1s actions. Even in the signaling game,
the beliefs of player 1 about player 2s beliefs must be consistent with the actual beliefs of player
2, which must be consistent with the payo¤ parameter that models the e¤ect of those beliefs upon
player 1s payo¤s. Hence, we have the essentials of a psychological game. Player 1s has induced
preferences upon player 2s beliefs. Thus, a psychological game can be interpreted as a short hand
for a larger signaling game. This shorthand is useful to manageable model psychological signaling
game, which would otherwise be a signaling game built upon a signaling game. See also [Gul and
Pesendorfer, 2005].
13The established psychological sequential equilibrium concept (See [Battigalli and Dufwenberg,
2008])would preclude a number of interesting and realistic o¤-equilibrium phenomena (e.g., the
screening e¤ect of non-credible shame discussed in section 3.4.5).
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reciprocate is better than not accept i¤:
v   e  2 (I)  0
The (qr qa) Condition: At each information set I 2 I for each type 2 2 fH;Lg ;
not reciprocate is better than not accept i¤:
v   122 (I)  2 (I)  0
The (r qr) Condition: At each information set I 2 I for each type 2 2 fH;Lg ;
reciprocate is better than not reciprocate i¤:
v   e  2 (I)  v   2 (I)  122 (I)
122 (I)  e
The (r qr; r qa) Condition: At each information set I 2 I for each type 2 2
fH;Lg ; accept and reciprocate is best i¤:
v   e  2 (I) and 122 (I)  e
The (a qa) Condition: At each information set I 2 I, for each type 2 2 fH;Lg ;
accept is better than reject i¤:
max

v   e  2 (I) ; v   122 (I)  2 (I)
	  0
max
 e; 122 (I)	  2 (I)  v
min

e; 122 (I)
	
< v   2 (I)
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3.3 Characterization of Equilibria
In the following, equilibrium will be abbreviated to "Eq.". Since, I only need distin-
guish beliefs that are after insinuation i and those that are after non-insinuation :i, I
will only write beliefs as a function of i or :i (e.g., write 2 (i) for 2 (I1i) ; I1i 2 I,
1 2 1; 2 2 2): In equilibria 1-3, the Proposers pool to :i. In equilibria 4-6,
the B Proposer separates to i. To avoid repetition, I state only what each type of
Responder does in the following proposition.
3.3.1 No Insinuation Equilibria
To shorten my proofs, I characterize o¤-equilibrium beliefs, which are all the same,
in the following lemma, which apply to all propositions that follow. Since beliefs on
the equilibrium path are true and can be substituted away with their corresponding
actions, they too are omitted in the propositions.
Lemma 2 For a xed action of the B Proposer s1 2 fi;:ig ; both Responders will
accept and not reciprocate
((aH (s1) = 1; rH (s1) = 0) ; (aL (s1) = 1; rL (s1) = 0)) (8)
when H (s1) = L (s1) = 0. The B Proposers payo¤ will be  k:
Proposition 3 (Eq. 1) There exist equilibria in which both types of Responders
accept and reciprocate i¤
v   e  2 and p12  e; 82 2 fH;Lg (9)
H (:i) = L (:i) = 1 (10)
Proposition 4 (Eq. 2) There exist equilibria in which the L type of Responder
accepts and reciprocates and the H type does not accept i¤
L (:i) = 1;  (:i) = 1; v   e  L and p1L  e (11)
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H (i) = 0 and L (i) = 0 (12)
and 8><>:
a) H (:i) = 1; v   p1H < H and p1H < e
or
b) H (:i) = 0; H > v and p1H < e
9>=>; (13)
Proposition 5 (Eq. 3:c) There exist equilibria in which both types of Responders
accept but only L reciprocates i¤
v   e  Lp2 and p1L  e (14)
0  v   Hp2 and p1H < e (15)
H (:i) = 0; L (:i) = 1;  (:i) = p2 (16)
L (i) = L (i) = 0 (17)
Proposition 6 (Eq. 3c) There exist equilibria in which both types of Responders
accept but only H reciprocates i¤
v   e  H (1  p2) and p1H  e (18)
0  v   L (1  p2) and p1L < e (19)
H (:i) = 1; L (:i) = 0;  (:i) = (1  p2) (20)
H (i) = L (i) = 0 (21)
Corollary 7 (Eq. 3¯c) Consider Eq. 3H. If v  e < H , then H only accepted if L
also accepted and but did not reciprocate.
3.3.2 Insinuation Equilibrium
In the following equilibrium, the B Proposer separates from the :B Proposer by
insinuating i.
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Proposition 8 (Eq. 4:c) There exist equilibria in which the L type of Responder
accepts and reciprocates and the H type does not accept i¤
L (i) = 1;  (i) = 1; v   e  L and L  e (22)
H (:i) = L (:i) = 0 (23)
and 8><>:
a) H (i) = 1; H > v   e and H  e
or
b) H (i) = 0; H > v and H  e
9>=>; (24)
Proposition 9 (Eq. 5:c) There exist equilibria in which the L type of Responder
accepts and reciprocates and the H type does not accept. More specically i¤
L (i) = 1;  (i) = 1; v   e  L and L  e (25)
H (:i) = 0 and L (:i) = 0 (26)
and 8><>:
a) H (i) = 1; v   H < H and H < e
or
b) H (i) = 0; H > v and H < e
9>=>; (27)
Proposition 10 (Eq. 6) There exist equilibria in which both types of Responders
accept and reciprocate. More specically i¤
v   e  2 and 2  e; 82 2 fH;Lg (28)
H (:i) = L (:i) = 1 (29)
Proposition 11 Suppose that either Eq. 4L or Eq. 3H can hold. If the not highly
shame averse type L are numerous enough
p2 >
k
(R + k)
(30)
16
the Proposer would prefer the outcome in Eq. 4L. Then, Eq. 3H can be eliminated
with the Intuitive Criterion.
Proposition 12 Eq. 3L can be eliminated with the Intuitive Criterion. Eq. 5L
would hold instead.
3.4 Graphical Analysis of Equilibria
Below, I plot equilibrium on the shame and guilt plain (; ) 2 R2+. An equilibrium
in this plain is a pair of points. Though in fact, we need a graph for each type, if we
assume that priors on Responders is p2 = 12 ; we can use one graph to represent both
types, as I have done below.
3.4.1 Vertical Boundary for H : (r  :a)
The vertical axis is divided by the reciprocate is better than not acceptor (r  :a)
condition: v   e  H; in which  = 1  p2 when both are accepting but only H is
reciprocating (gure 1), or  = 1, when only the reciprocating type accepts (gure
2). (If both were accepting and only L was reciprocating then, the dividing line
would be where  = p2.) Hence, when (r  :a) is rewritten v e  H : the vertical
boundaries for H 2
n
v e
1
; v e
1 p2
o
:
3.4.2 Horizontal Boundary for H : (r  :r)
The horizontal axis is divided up by the reciprocate is better than not reciprocate
or (r  :r) condition : 1HH  e; in which 1 (:i) = p1 in a pooling equilibrium
(gure 2) and 1 (i) = 1 and 1 (:i) = 0 in a separating equilibrium (gure 3). Since,
H 2 f0; 1g, when (r  :r) is rewritten as H  e1H , the horizontal boundaries for
H 2
n
0; e; e
p1
;1
o
.
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3.4.3 Diagonal Boundary for H : (:r  :a)
The diagonal is divided by the not reciprocate is better than not acceptor (:r  :a)
condition for H : v   1HH   H  014. This condition, which can be more
conveniently written as v 1HH

 H only matters when not reciprocating is better
than reciprocating (:r  r) : 1HH < e andH has not accepted, i.e., H is in region
:a: There are two possibilities: H accepts or not.
 Should H have accepted and not reciprocated, consistency 6 would require
that H = rH = 0. Thus, from the perspective of the H Responder who has
accepted and not reciprocated, the shame H boundary for accepting would be
dened by v

 H in which  = p2: (Not shown in any gure.)
 Should H not have accepted, then beliefs about Hs rate of reciprocation had
he accepted are not constrained H 2 f0; 1g. Recall from 1 that
 = L  2 + H  (1  2)
 Suppose that H believes that had he accepted, he would have been ex-
pected to reciprocate, then H = 1 and
v 1H

 H ; in which  =
1  1 + 0  1 = 1:
 If on the other hand, H believes that had he accepted, he would not
have been expected to reciprocate, then H = 0 and
v

 H ; in which
 = 1  1 + 0  0 = 1:
Hence, when (:r  :a) is rewritten as v 1HH

 H ; the possible diagonal
boundaries are (H ; H) 2
n
(H ; H) : H =
v
p2
or v   1H   H = 0
o
:
The diagonal for L is comparable except that  = 1   p2 when both accept and
H reciprocates, but L does not reciprocate. (See gure 2.)
From this point onwards, I will generally suppress the type index ,e.g., Lin 4L
in the " so that I might instead index these equilibria by aor bwhich indicates
14If H is considering :r  :a then, by the positive prot condition 4 and consistency 6, :c must
be accepting and reciprocating: :c = r:c = 1:
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di¤erent o¤-equilibrium beliefs,e.g., 4a or 4b.
If both H and L have high enough guilt sensitivity to reciprocate, then the
Proposer only has to choose a gift v that will cause them to accept. This is the
situation in Eq. 1 (not gured). If however, one type is not sensitive enough to guilt,
and guilt and shame are negatively correlated, the Proposer can choose a gift that
only the less shame sensitive type would accept. This is the situation Eq. 2 in gure
1.
Figure 1: Only :c accepts and reciprocates.
However, if guilt and shame are positively correlated, we may have the situation in
Eq. 3 in gure 2.
19
3.4.4 Screening With Shame Spillovers
In Eq. 3H, the highly shame averse Responder H; who has high shame and guilt
sensitivity, is accepting and reciprocating, while L; who has lower shame and guilt
sensitivity, is accepting but not reciprocating. In Eq. 4, the sameH has not accepted,
while L has accepted and reciprocated. Eq. 3H has the L type of Responder in region
:r and H in region r. Eq. 4 has this same L in region r and H in region :a. The
bribing Proposer B, by separating with an insinuation, increases guilt causing the L
Responder with guilt range e  L  ep1 and shame range 0  L  v   e (gure 2)
to accept and reciprocate.
Figure 2: Both accept. Only c reciprocates.
When they do so, they exert a negative externality for their paired type in the guilt
range e
p1
 H and shame range 1   e  H  v e1 p2 that causes H to not accept
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(gure 3). The solid arrow in gure 3 indicates the necessary marginal increase in
the r region which occurs when insinuation separates: 1 (:i) = p1 ! 1 (i) = 1: The
dotted arrows indicate the possible changes in the boundaries after an insinuation,
driven by changes in the value of  = p2 !  = 1:
Figure 3: Insinuation. Only :c reciprocates.
Eq. 3H was maintained by the Proposers belief that, should there be an insinuation,
the Responder will infer he is facing the :B Proposer and hence accept and not
reciprocate. Proposition 7 establishes that if the L type is great enough of the
proportion of the Responder population, the non-insinuation equilibria Eq. 3H will
fail the Intuitive Criterion. Upon observing insinuation, Responders can infer that
they are facing the B Proposer, since insinuate is dominated for :B. When L is
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a greater proportion of Responders, the L Responders best response of reciprocate
would be su¢ cient to make the B Proposer deviate to reciprocate. The prediction
for this set of parameters would then be, the Proposer will insinuate. She will lose
the prescriptions of the highly shame averse type but gain the prescriptions of the
not highly shame averse type. This is what the Proposer in the Yale incident could
have been trying to achieve with her insinuation.
When there is negative correlation between guilt and shame, as in Eq. 3L, in-
sinuation can cause the non-reciprocating type H to not accept, as in Eq. 5L of
gure 4. When there is positive correlation, as in Eq. 3H, insinuation can cause the
non-reciprocating type to reciprocate, as in Eq. 6 of gure 4.
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Figure 4: Free-rider rejects or reciprocates.
3.4.5 The Screening E¤ect of Non-Credible Shame
Main Intuition In all of the separating equilibria, the Proposer can use the value
of the gift and the shame spillover of reciprocation to screen for the highly shame
averse type, who either was not sensitive enough to guilt to reciprocate (Eq. 2a
and 2b), or did not believe that he was expected to reciprocate (Eq. 4b). Shame,
however, is a visceral emotion. One would expect that people may not always react
rationally to the possibility of it and that may be important for predicting behavior.
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In my model, unobservable reciprocation occurs after observable acceptance. This
dynamic structure allows a Responder to reject based upon the shame attending on
beliefs (about others beliefs) about what he would have done, had he accepted. The
di¤erence between his beliefs and what he actually would have done can capture non-
acceptance from an overestimation of shame. For some range of shame sensitivities
in Eq. 2 and 4b, only the belief whoever accepts reciprocateswould have been
su¢ cient to deter acceptance. But in those equilibria, had the highly shame averse
type of Responder accepted, he would not have reciprocated. His guilt would not have
been su¢ cient. In rejecting, the Responder did not take into account the diminution
of the aggregate reciprocation rate of all who accept from his own non-reciprocating
acceptance. This outcome models the possibility that those who rejected in the Yale
incident may not have taken into account the diminution of the shame of acceptance,
as a result of their own acceptance. In contrast, those who accepted may have
foreseen the possibility, as they themselves suggested.
Graphical Analysis More formally, recall that in dynamic games, o¤-equilibrium
beliefs need not be consistent with histories after an actual deviation. Such beliefs
allow for the possibility of incredible threats. In signaling games, the o¤-equilibrium
beliefs themselves that an observer best responds to need not be credible. These
beliefs can be eliminated by forward induction arguments like the Intuitive Criterion
of [Cho and Kreps, 1987 ]. The key di¤erence in psychological games is that the
signallersown preferences depend directly upon the observers beliefs (or his beliefs
about them). These beliefs and their e¤ect upon the signallers preferences can also
be credible or not. They too may not withstand a forward induction argument. In
the separating equilibria of this game, the o¤-equilibrium beliefs of the player who
not accepted allow for non-credible shame and guilt.
In Eq. 2a and 2b, type Hs guilt sensitivity is not su¢ cient to induce recip-
rocation since H <
e
p1
: The non-acceptance condition :(a  :a) is dened as
min fe; p1HHg > v   H.
In order for H to reject in Eq. 2a, he must believe
1. If I accept, I will be expected to reciprocate.H = 1 and that others believe,
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2. whoever accepts reciprocates = 1.
But, others know that H <
e
p1
: Therefore, cannot expect him to reciprocate:
Therefore, he cannot believe that they would expect him to reciprocate upon accep-
tance. Hence, H = 0. But, if they did not believe that he would reciprocate, they
could only believe that whoever accepts might reciprocate < 1. Thus, the di¤er-
ence in the shame sensitivity that would keep H from accepting: H > v p1H ; and
the shame sensitivity that should keep H from accepting: H  vp2 ; is in the shame
region v
p2
 H  v   p1H and e > p1H : (See dashed triangle marked (2) in gure
5.) If the Proposer insinuates, this region would be v
p2
 H  v   H and e > H :
Figure 5: No Insinuation. Only qc reciprocates.
In Eq. 2b, H believes that, had he accepted, he was not expected to reciprocate
H = 0. It was only the raw shame externality of L that kept him from accepting:
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0 > v   H . But, then, if he did accept, he should anticipate that the shame should
be diluted to Hp2 < H by his own diminution of it; since he would not reciprocate.
For him to reject then, when he anticipated this dilution, his shame sensitivity would
have to be very high: H  vp2 : Then, the di¤erence in the shame sensitivity that
would keep H from accepting H > v and the shame sensitivity that should keep H
from accepting H  vp2 is in the shame region vp2  H  v:(See dashed rectangle
marked (1) in region H <
e
p1
in gure 5.)
4 Discussion
To my knowledge, the literature on bribery does not consider the use of shame or
guilt and does not acknowledge the psychological signicance of non-monetary bribes.
Just to x ideas, I assume the low rationality case discussed in section 3.4.4. It is
assumed below that a rst best policy would redirect resources used for bribery into
R & D, eliminate the health and monetary costs of distortionary prescribing, without
imposing psychological costs upon doctors.
4.1 Policy Implications
4.1.1 Bans
Surprisingly, only a handful of medical schools restrict drug rep to doctor gift giving15.
The rational for the reluctance to ban can be seen in my model by introducing the
regulator as a third player who would either need to allow the Drug Rep to give or
who can reject for both types of doctors. In the former case, the regulator in e¤ect
gives to the doctor. In the latter case, the regulator in e¤ect rejects for the doctor.
In either case, we can convert the drug rms prots from bribing:
R (p2 (rL) + (1  p2) (rH)) > k
15"Group Urges Ban on Medical Giveaways." (Harris, Gardiner, New York Times, April 28, 2008)
describes a recent e¤ort to increase bans in medical schools.
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into a social utility constraint that must also be met for giving to occur:
u  S (p2 (rL) + (1  p2) (rH))  0
in which u is the social utility of permitting gifts and S is the sensitivity to distorted
prescribing. Suppose that the regulator bans. Given a ban, doctors could infer
that the regulator believed that the rate of reciprocation would have made the ban
worthwhile:
u  S (p2 (rL) + (1  p2) (rH)) < 0
where in equilibrium where in equlibrium 2 (I) = r2 , 2 2 fL;Hg and
 (I) = L (I)  2 + H (I)  (1  2) (31)
In other words, the regulator must have believed that the aggregate rate of recip-
rocation would have been too high if it had not banned: u
S
< : But, unlike Eq.
2 where shame could be avoided by rejecting, when the regulator bans, all doctors
su¤er shame through the implied ; all doctors would have su¤ered from the be-
lief that they would have reciprocated enough to warrant a ban. A persistent and
unavoidable insult to the integrity of their profession might deter entry of qualied
people into a specic hospital, or in the health care industry in general 16.
4.1.2 Gift Ceilings
Gift ceilings, like a ban, would expand the area the non-acceptance areas marked :a
in all gures and hence, increase the area of o¤-equilibrium beliefs, with the same
e¤ect as a ban of imposing non-credible shame on all doctors, though doctors can
now separate by not accepting below the gift ceiling. Instead of feeling completely
untrusted, doctors would feel untrusted above the gift ceiling v. However, because
gift ceilings allow for some acceptance for v  v, they could shift the situation away
from Eq. 1 to Eq. 2 or 4, thus reducing reciprocation by reducing acceptance. In
16Nearly 60 percent of doctors had considered getting out of medicine because of low morale
(Williams, Alex, "The Falling-Down Professions," New York Times, January 6, 2008).
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the gure 6, as v ! 0, the diagonal region :r and the horizontal region r  :a;
whose upper bound is v e

on the  axis would both shift towards the origin17. As
a consequence, the region where doctors would accept and not reciprocate :r would
shrink, which would cut the rms costs, increasing the marginal e¤ectiveness of
bribing. The gift ceiling then could have the perverse consequence of making bribery
more e¤ective by forcing the low guilt high shame type L, who did not reciprocate
before, to reject, shifting the situation from Eq. 3H to Eq. 2.
Figure 6: The e¤ect of a gift ceiling.
4.1.3 Fines
 can also include the e¤ects of pencuniary punishments for acceptance contingent
upon beliefs about subsequent intended actions, if ^ =  + fines or if nes are a
function of ; ^ = ( + fines). v e

> v e
^
implies that the r regions in all gures
would shrink, reducing the e¤ectiveness of gifts, requiring a larger gift v for the same
17This analysis must be circumscribed by the fact that shame  and guilt 2 are likely only
separable into a constant sensitivity component and a belief component within a narrow range of
v. Conceivably, these sensitivities could also be a function of v. Even supposing that they were
constant though, the e¤ect of a gift ceiling would still be hard to predict.
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acceptance rate. This higher  would have a similar e¤ect as a lower gift ceiling.
The purely psychological e¤ect of shame will be even more pronounced if nes signal
greater disapprobation [i.e.,  (nes) >>  (no nes)].
4.1.4 Gift Registries
Gift registries, which record all gifts over a certain amount (e.g., $50), have been
legislated in a number of states18 [Ross et. al., 2007]. If preferences over beliefs are
monotonic on the number of people who have them, then gift registries amount to
increasing ; the sensitivity to shame. Increasing  amounts to decreasing v via a
gift ceiling with the same consequences. The e¤ectiveness of gift registries is even
more di¢ cult to assess because rmsare not forthcoming with data, claiming that
these are trade secrets.
4.1.5 Educational Interventions A¤ecting , 1
An initial study demonstrated that education as to the truemotives of rms and the
social costs of accepting gifts can indeed cut acceptance [Randall et. al., 2005]. But
if educational interventions did this by increasing  for all guilt types, it would have
the same e¤ect as a ceiling on gift value. But, if an educational intervention increases
doctors belief of facing the bribing Drug Rep, that would have the same e¤ect as the
Drug Rep always insinuating and hence, increasing 1 (:i) = p1 to 1 (i) = 1. Such
an educational intervention could result in more inuenced prescriptions by making
it more protable. This fact was shown in Proposition 10, in which insinuation
switched reciprocation from the less populous Responder to the more populous, while
eliminating free-riding. It was also shown in Proposition 11, in which the free-rider
did not accept after insinuation. Counterintutively, regulators could try to decrease
the prior belief on the B type of Proposer 1 = p1 ! 0, e.g., by promoting the idea
that all rms are actually non-bribing. If that worked, guilt in non-reciprocation
would go down, which would eventually result in less giving with a bribing intention.
See the shift of the guilt boundary of region r in gure 6 as dened by e
p1
as p1 ! 0.
18Medina, Jennifer, "Drug Lobbying Kills Gift Disclosure Bill," New York Times, June 29, 2006.
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4.1.6 Targeting 2 ;  Through The Gift Giving Convention
Some hospitals require drug rms to give gifts only through a department represen-
tative, who in turn would give to doctors. In an iterated version of my model: the
interposition of an intermediary would weaken the mutual knowledge of the expecta-
tion of reciprocation, because it would undermine the forward induction procedure
for inferring beliefs about reciprocation. The Drug Rep cannot expect reciprocation
from the department rep, if he/she were not a doctor. The department rep, who
does not gain from reciprocation, certainly would not be giving in expectation of
reciprocation from the doctor. As an alternative, a hospital could target conventions
and redirect shame and guilt by nding a worthy charity that doctors would feel
even more guilty not donating gifts to, so that the Drug Rep would cease to expect
reciprocation.
If doctors uniformly believed that nothing was expected of their type, i.e., 2 !
0;82 2 fH;Lg, then the region for acceptance will expand as its upper bound
v e

!1; at the same time that the region for not reciprocating r, whose lower bound
is dened by e
12
! 1: Doctors will be more likely to accept though they would
feel less guilt in not reciprocating, resulting in decreased distortionary prescribing
without demoralizing doctors. Contrariwise, should the situation be described by
Eq. 3¯H, in which  = 1   p2 and both types of doctors accept, but only :H type
reciprocates, policy makers should try to convince everyone that all types of doctors
are in fact reciprocating so as to increase ! 1 to prompt rejection from a majority
of doctors. See Eq. 3¯H.
5 Conclusion
This paper began by introducing the problem of explaining the coincidence of 1)
rising cost of prescription drugs 2) drug rm prots that did not seem attributable
to pharmaceutical innovation and 3) large expenditures on marketing to doctors
 in particular, gifts, occurring in the absence of monitoring and enforcement of
a quid pro quo relationship. I have posited a psychological mechanism by which
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reciprocation may be induced in equilibrium, even in the absence of monitoring. I
used a now fairly well established fact that guilt (See [Charness and Dufwenberg,
2006] for example.) could cause reciprocation for gifts to show in a psychological
trust game how 1) unobserved reciprocation could give rise to a shame spillover
at acceptance that could screen for low guilt 2) the e¤ect of the spillover could
magnied and ne tuned with insinuation, and 3) o¤-equilibrium beliefs could screen
for reciprocation through non-credible shame, if doctors are not highly rational. The
Yale incident illustrated these ideas. In it, the Drug Rep had to consider the trade-
o¤ between being direct or indirect in her bribing intent. Directness provokes the
guilt that would lead to greater reciprocation, given acceptance. But directness
increased the anticipation of reciprocation and hence, the shame of acceptance19. I
explained the circumstances in which the Drug Rep could use that shame to screen for
reciprocating guilt, and how current policies to deter reciprocation could either make
bribing more e¤ective or impose unacceptable shame spillovers upon all doctors.
Doctors are experts. Expertise opens the client to expert relationship to exploita-
tion by third parties. The client cannot tell if the expert is acting in their best interest
for the same reason that the client needs the experts help. Hence, clients need to
trust the experts they go to. Hence also, experts must be averse to the appearance of
betraying their clients trust and therefore, anything approaching explicit contracting
to betray that trust. Gifts are a way for third parties to camouage such contracting
However, third parties face an incentive problem similar to that which they may try
to exploit; Expertise also makes the experts actions unobservable to the third party.
Contracts on those actions are therefore unenforceable by the usual means. Third
parties need to trust their experts even to betray the trust of others.
19This trade-o¤ between directness and indirectness may also explain why cash gifts are generally
not used with doctors. They are too direct. Everyone who would accept would reciprocate. Because
of that, no one would accept.
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6 Appendix A
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7 Appendix B: Background on Pharmaceutical In-
dustry Gift Giving
Medical professionals, health policy makers, and the general public have become
increasingly concerned about the e¤ects of pharmaceutical company gifts to doc-
tors in the face of costs that have risen disproportionately to measures of e¢ cacy.
These gifts range from free drug samples to items unrelated to the products manu-
factured by the company, such as expensive dinners, exotic vacation packages only
tangentially related to short conferences or even large payments for very undemand-
ing "consulting work". Gifts constitute a signicant part of the $19 billion[Brennan
et. al., 2006]20 spent on marketing to 650,000 prescribing US doctors  including
the salaries of 85,000 pharmaceutical rm representatives who visit an average of 10
doctors per day. At the same time, patient spending on prescription medications has
more than doubled between 1995-2001 from $64 billion to $154.5 billion in 2001, with
an estimated one-quarter of this increase resulting from a shift among medical pro-
fessionals to the prescribing of more expensive drugs [Dana and Loewenstein, 2003].
This gure is on its way to double again and totaled $252 billion in 2006 [Herper
and Kang, 2006].
Increased costs could be due to better medicine. In 2000, the average price of
these "new" drugs was nearly twice the average price of existing drugs prescribed for
the same symptoms. But, according to [Dana and Loewenstein, 2003], the US Food
and Drug Administration judged 76% of all approved new drugs between 1989 to
2000 to be only moderately more e¢ cacious than existing treatments, many being a
modication of an older product with the same ingredients. Not surprisingly, phar-
maceutical rms are among the most protable21 [Fortune 500, 2001-2005]. PhRMA,
20Half is spent on free samples, which according to [Adair and Holmgren, 2005] shift doctor
prescriptions habit by 10%. Doctors are also less critical of the appropriateness of a drug when
giving out free samples [Morgan et. al., 2006]. As pointed out by a psychiatry blogger, rms may
be feeding doctors desire to be heroes in the eyes of their patients with free samples [Carlat, 2007].
Other initial evidence that free samples do have a signicant impact on prescribing are in [Chew
et. al., 2000].
21"From 1995 to 2002, pharmaceutical manufacturers were the nations most protable industry.
They ranked 3rd in 2003 and 2004, 5th in 2005, and in 2006 they ranked 2nd, with prots (return
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the drug industry trade group, claims that this extraordinary protability is due to
extraordinary risks taken, as indicated by their posted R&D expenditures. Drug
rms have been highly secretive about the specics of their R&D spending data.
One study argued that marketing dwarfs R&D spending by three fold [Public Citi-
zen, 2001].
Doctors rarely acknowledge the inuence of promotions on their prescribing. A
number of studies, however, have established a positive relationship between prescrip-
tion drug promotion and sales. There is also a consensus in the literature that doctors
who report relying more on advertisements prescribe more heavily, more expensively,
less generically, less appropriately and often adopt new drugs more quickly, leading
to more side e¤ects [Norris et. al., 2005]. The bias in self assessment as to the e¤ects
of promotion is illustrated dramatically in one study in which, after returning from
all-expenses paid trips to educational symposia in resort locations, doctors reported
that their prescribing would not be increased. Their tracked subsequent prescribing,
however, attested to a signicant increase [Orlowski and Wateska, 1992].
What exactly these gifts do is a topic of much debate. Drug rms have been mon-
itoring physician prescribing imperfectly since 1950 through various sampling tech-
niques[Greene, 2007]. Beginning in the 1990s, they were able to purchase physician
level data. One major data provider to pharmaceutical rms, IMS Health, collects
information on 70% of all prescriptions lled in community pharmacies [Steinbrook,
2006] and had revenues over $2.7 billion in 2007. Since 2005, the AMA has received
$44 million/year from licensing physician data (the AMA Masterle) which contains
physician proles for 900,000 physicians that can be used with pharmacy prescrip-
tions data to construct physician prescribing proles [Greene, 2007]. However, even
as late as 2001, four in 10 physicians did not realize that drug industry represen-
tatives had information about their prescribing practices[Kaiser Foundation Survey,
2001].
Drug rms claim that gifts are incidental to their motive to persuade and are
used merely to improve doctor attitude towards information presented to them22.
on revenues) of 19.6% compared to 6.3% for all Fortune 500 rms."[Kaiser Foundation, 2007]
22A record $875 million ne against one rm for kickbacks and lavish gifts to get doctors to
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Doctors themselves admit that gifts increase the likelihood of their attendance at
drug rm presentations. In one survey however, 67% of faculty and 77% of residents
believed accepting gifts could inuence prescribing, especially if gifts greater than
$100 were involved [Madhavan et. al., 1997]. In another, 61% of physicians thought
that their prescribing would be una¤ected by expensive gifts like textbooks, but only
16% thought their colleagues would be similarly una¤ected [Steinman et. al., 2001]
23. (From now on, this will be referred to as the 61/16 survey.) Furthermore,
doctors assessment as to whether they are a¤ected by gifts negatively correlates
with the amount and frequency of gifts they accept [Wazana, 2000].
There has been little or no state or federal sanctions of the amount or type of
gifts that a doctor can accept. The American Medical Association and PhRMA have
both formally recommended that doctors not accept gifts outside of textbooks with
retail value greater than $100 and no more than eight at a time24. Most doctors are
not aware of even these guidelines and enforcement is unheard of. Perhaps under the
pressure of public uproar and the threat of regulation, many pharmaceutical rms
adopted a similar code for themselves in 2002, and apparently to some e¤ect. A new
code going into e¤ect in January 2009 prohibits distribution of noneducational items
to healthcare professionals including small gifts, such as pens, notepads, mugs, and
similar reminder itemswith company or product logos on them, even if they are
practice-related[Hosansky (2008)]. The e¤ects of these measures are yet to be seen.
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